Addressing seed security in disaster response - linking relief with development by Sperling, L. et al.
Edited by
Louise Sperling, Tom Remington,
Jon M Haugen, and Sigrid Nagoda
 
 
Norwegian
Ministry
of
Foreign Affairs
ADDRESSING SEED SECURITY IN DISASTER RESPONSE
LINKING RELIEF WITH DEVELOPMENT
OVERVIEW
OVERVIEW
Edited by
Louise Sperling, Tom Remington,
Jon M Haugen, and Sigrid Nagoda
ADDRESSING SEED SECURITY IN DISASTER RESPONSE
LINKING RELIEF WITH DEVELOPMENT
 
 
Norwegian
Ministry
of
Foreign Affairs
Copyright © International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)
Cali, Colombia
Citation: Sperling, L., T. Remington, J. M Haugen, and S. Nagoda (Eds.) 2004. Addressing Seed 
Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development, Overview. 
Cali, Colombia: International Center for Tropical Agriculture.
Available on-line at http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/africa/seeds.htm.
ISBN: 958–694–071–3
9789586940719
Acknowledgements
This volume results from extensive on-the ground assessments in seven African countries.  There are
many people to thank for its coming to fruition.
Two sets of donors had the vision to fund comprehensive follow-up of  emergency interventions.  From
the United States Agency for International Development, Laura Powers of the Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance and Eric Witte of the Economic Growth and Agricultural Trade Unit have been relentless in
trying to find out what really happens—and in improving emergency practice. Lillian Wikstrøm of the
Section for Humanitarian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway has also shown particular
interest in improving crisis response.
A range of practitioners also had the honesty and energy to look at the effects of a range of their
activities. We particularly want to recognize the follow organizations: for the Mozambique case: Save
the Children-USA/Mozambique, the District Director of Agriculture in Memba, CARE/Mozambique;
for the Malawi case: ActionAid Malawi, Save the Children UK/Malawi, Plan International Malawi;
World Vision Malawi, Concern Universal Malawi, Catholic Development Commission of Malawi
(CADECOM, CRS implementing partner); for the Zimbabwe case: CRS/Zimbabwe, SC-UK/
Zimbabwe, CTDT (CRS implementing partner), the SADC Seed Security Network; for the Ethiopia
case: CARE/Ethiopia, CRS/Ethiopia, FAO/Ethiopia;  for the eastern Kenya Case: FAO/Kenya; for the
western Kenya Case:  Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute/Kakamega and the Organic Matter
Management Network (OMMN); for the Burundi case: CRS/Burundi; and for the western Uganda case: 
CRS Uganda and the International Plant Genetic Resource Institute (IPGRI).
There is also a set of individuals and institutions, whose expertise spurred the project members to pursue
issues more clearly: we acknowledge particularly Steve McSween of SCF-USA/Mozambique, Mikkel
Grum of IPGRI, Jean Claude Rubyogo of CIAT, Trygve Berg and Cary Fowler of NORAGRIC in
Norway, and from the FAO, Paul Rossiter, David Cooper, Tom Osborn, and Leslie Lipper.
Finally, we thank our respective organizations for allowing us to work together in this unusual alliance,
uniting research and emergency efforts and  the skills of  international and national research centers and
nongovernmental organizations. Our recognition to CIAT/Africa, CRS-East and Central Africa, and
CARE Norway for enabling this collaboration.
Dedication
“To the many farm families who never seem to catch a break—yet who show tremendous courage and
resilience in the face of disaster.
And to the many practitioners who do their best to assist—against formidable odds and often at
considerable risk.”

Overview of Findings and Reflections
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Introduction
This volume contains eight case studies managed by CIAT, CRS, and CARE Norway in a project
entitled, Assisting disaster-affected and chronically stressed communities in East, Central and Southern 
Africa: Focus on small farmer systems. The case studies were undertaken to evaluate various forms of
emergency seed aid and to couple these with analyses of the broader seed and crop systems. The
objectives were to understand if and how vulnerable farmers are being helped by the kinds of assistance
they receive—and how to move forward on improving practice.
The work was undertaken over a two-year period, in seven countries in Africa. In all cases, the seed aid
practitioners were also engaged in the evaluations and reflections, so that “lessons learned” could
immediately influence the “next steps of practice.” It is to the credit of the participating national
agricultural research systems (NARS) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that they were
willing to take a hard look at the effectiveness of their interventions. Equally, the donors, both
USAID/OFDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Norway, are to be lauded for promoting substantive
follow-up on emergency assistance because such follow-up is rare.
Table 1 gives the broad overview of the major features of the case studies: the countries in which they
were undertaken, the stresses that originally triggered a decision to supply seed-related assistance, and
the types of interventions that eventually unrolled. Note that the analyses of the real stresses changed as
the work progressed.
Table 2 hones in on the salient (defining) questions of each field program. Five of the cases address key
features of specific interventions (such as introductions of new varieties), while three present overviews
of the practice and evolution of seed aid on a country-wide basis.
In the volume that follows, case study abstracts provide findings specific to the intervention and context.
In this introduction, we step back and reflect on the broader findings that emerge from this rare
opportunity to examine seed aid across countries, across stresses, across interventions, and across
different types of seed systems.
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Table 1. CIAT/CRS/CARE-Norway Project: Major Descriptors
Case study descriptors Content
Countries Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe
Trigger Stresses Drought, civil strife, flood, plant disease (and crop breakdown),
distorted political economy
Interventions • Direct seed distribution
• Seed vouchers and fairs
• Starter packs and targeted input distribution
• Community-based seed production
• Introduction of new varieties
Crop foci Maize, beans, cassava, sorghum, rice, millet, cowpeas, bananas,
sweet potatoes
also: wheat, barley, vanilla, cocoa, moringa
Table 2. CIAT/CRS/CARE-Norway Project: Defining Questions
Specific site Defining question
Analysis of Specific Interventions
Eastern Kenya Direct seed distribution and seed vouchers and fairs: what is their relative
cost-effectiveness? 
Northern Burundi Seed vouchers and fairs and the role of traders: who benefits?
Western Uganda Seed vouchers and fairs: real agro-biodiversity gains?
Western Kenya Introductions of new  (self-pollinated) varieties in period of crop breakdown: do 
informal farmer producer groups move quality seed, and quickly? 
Northern
Mozambique
Introductions of new varieties in a period of crop breakdown: are there special
concerns with vegetatively propagated material?
Overview of Seed Relief and Evolution of Practice
Malawi Direct seed distributions
Seed vouchers and fairs
Starter packs/targeted input programs
Community-based seed production
Ethiopia Direct seed distributions/local procurement
Zimbabwe Direct seed distributions
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General findings: Seed systems under stress
Acute response implemented in chronic stress contexts
Emergency seed system assistance was delivered in six out of the eight cases in response to what was
characterized as an acute stress. That is, acute seed insecurity was presumed to have been brought on by
distinct, short-duration events that affected a significant portion of the population. However, more
in-depth analysis, in all  six cases, showed the problems to be of a more chronic, systemic nature: e.g.,
declining productivity, water-related stress, ongoing civil unrest, and/or misplaced political policies.
The other two cases, both of crop breakdowns (one in western Kenya with beans and the other in
northern Mozambique with cassava), were the only ones in which prior assessments (or diagnoses)
actually took place. These revealed that the “acute manifestation” was due to more systemic biotic,
abiotic, and economic pressures: build-up of plant disease, lack of crop rotations, declining farm sizes.
The result of an “acute” response in a more chronically stressed context means that the problem is not
alleviated and that seed system assistance is then needed—again and again. However, the effects of
giving “acute” aid in chronic stress contexts are not just neutral (and may have negative impacts). During 
the second and third rounds of aid, one is not just starting from the same (compromised) baseline.
Increasing evidence, within and beyond these case studies, demonstrates that aid given on a repeated
basis distorts farmers' own seed procurement strategies (see Malawi case herein and Kenya case,
Sperling, 2002), undermines local seed/grain market functioning (Burundi case herein), and even
compromises the development of more commercial seed supply systems (Zimbabwe case herein and
Tripp and Rohrbach, 2001).
So, there are neg a tive ef fects of giv ing acute seed aid on a re peated ba sis, par tic u larly for vul ner a ble
farm ers, for lo cal and re gional trad ers, and for the de vel op ers of private enterprise.
Chronic seed distribution promotes the emergence 
of a relief seed system
Seed aid distribution is taking place in a large number of countries: one season, two seasons, three
seasons, and beyond. The giving of seed aid is itself becoming a “chronic” activity. Table 3 summarizes
the number of years seed aid has been given in several of the countries under study. Figures have been
amassed from actual government records, from NGO reports, and from the accounts of implementers
working on the ground. There seem to be few checks for stopping such assistance (simply when funds
dry up?) and deliberate exit strategies have not been planned.
Table 3. Chronic Seed Aid Distribution
Country Seed Aid Distributions
Burundi 22 seasons since 1995
Eastern Kenya 1992/93, 1995/97, 2000/02, 2004
Ethiopia Food aid 22 years since 1983/84
Seed aid on and off during the same period
Malawi 9 seasons or more since 1992
Zimbabwe Near continuous since 1991 (food aid, seed aid, or both)
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The rise of a chronic seed aid system has been identified as a profitable business opportunity for the
entrepreneurial, who specialize in quick delivery of a small range of crops. It has also led to the rise of a
separate seed system based on relief, i.e., a "relief seed system" (see the Ethiopia and Zimbabwe cases).
Relief seed systems are created to assist farm communities in post-disaster contexts and are based on the
assumption that other seed channels (in both the formal and farmer seed systems) are simply
nonfunctional.
Relief seed systems have evolved dramatically and differentially in different countries in Africa, but
their rise has been quick and steady. They seem to be of two basic types: in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and
Malawi, there are commercially based relief seed systems. This is because of the importance of maize as
a commercial crop and the dominance of commercial maize in the seed market. In countries without a
significant maize-based commercial seed sector (like Burundi) or those with a niche market (Ethiopia),
donors and relief agencies have always relied on the farmer seed system to source their seed for
emergency redistribution. The functioning of such systems involves a straightforward set of steps: a
disaster is declared, seed need is assumed, and then a well-established chain of suppliers moves into
action.
No diagnosis and an assumption of lack of seed trigger
seed-related disaster responses
The lack of any diagnosis related to the seed system has now become a commonplace observation within 
the disaster literature (Sperling and Cooper, 2003). In practice, one of four strategies is employed for
“assessing” seed security and none is sufficiently accurate or timely for assessing seed security among
vulnerable farming populations: 
• No assessment is done at all—and seed need is assumed.
• Food security assessments are effected—and seed need is assumed.
• A crop production fall (decline) is measured—and seed need is assumed.
• Lengthy surveys of farming and rural production systems are completed—and the results are
analyzed and written up—after emergency seed has been delivered.
Within the cases documented here, only two instances of diagnosis or problem assessment were noted.
Both were research-driven and related to an analysis of progressive crop failure due to plant
disease/farming system pressures.
In the absence of seed-related needs assessment, the default option has been to assume that there is a lack
of available seed. This has been done in a wide range of disaster contexts since the start of seed aid
practice.
Two sources of concrete information, from very different perspectives, indicate how incorrect this
automatic assessment of lack of availability often is.
1. A growing number of studies have actually traced where farmers in “disaster” situations sourced
the seed they planted—in areas where seed aid distribution had taken place. Table 4 indicates that in 
contexts where precise data were examined (and with larger sample sizes), relatively little of the
seed sown came from emergency aid (with the importance of the assistance varying by crop and
context). This means that, as farmers were lining up to become beneficiaries of free seed aid, they
were simultaneously sourcing non-aid channels to access most of their needed seed supplies.
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Table 4. Importance of Relief Seed in Farmers’ Overall Seed Supply during Disaster
Periods
Context Crop
% of seed planted
sourced through relief Source
Zimbabwe/drought/political 
instability/2003
Pearl millet 12* Bramel and Remington 
(this volume)
Rwanda/war/1995 Beans 28** Sperling, 1997
Kenya/drought/1997 Maize 11 Sperling, 2002
Somalia/drought/2000 Sorghum 10-17* Longley et al., 2001
Somalia/drought//2003 Maize 3 Longley et al., 2001
* This figure includes seed delivered by NGOs and the government during the stress period, some of which 
may have been labeled “relief.” During “‘normal’” times, farmers access 5% of their pearl millet seed from 
these channels.
** The figure of 28% came from the first seed distribution, two months after intensive fighting ceased. Relief 
seed was then distribution again, the next major planting, and in January 1996, and only 6% of the bean seed 
shown came via relief channels.
2. This project also set out to assess seed availability via local seed/grain traders, who may supply
seed in crisis periods. In Burundi, where seed aid has been given since 1995, 41 traders recounted
their experience with seed sourcing over the last 10 years of drought and war. Seventy-eight percent 
indicated that there had never been a problem with availability. The other 22% nuanced their
answers, with only one (item a below) suggesting an absolute lack at one point in time (see Burundi
case, this volume).
a. only once—during the 1993/94 war—when everyone was fleeing (n=1);
b. in 1993, when all seed had been bought up by the emergency NGOs;
c. during the “events,” seed was available in Rwanda (30 km away) but “my bicycle broke
down”;
d. the problem was price.
Trader remarks highlight how relative the term “availability” is and how directly linked it is to a trader’s
means. Those who source seed using bicycles, and with slim price margins, have different parameters of
availability than those with large trucks (and who also easily cross borders). As this overview is being
written, a large-scale commodity trader has been hired by the project to assess seed availability in eastern 
Kenya—where government and NGOs have been distributing free seed on an impressive scale (for the
second season in 2004). The Kenya analysis is drawing results comparable to the Burundian one: seed is
widely available in local seed/grain channels. Via the Kenya case, this project has commissioned the
commodity trader to construct a practical checklist for assessing market functioning (including seed
availability) from an expert point of view.
In sum, in terms of assessment, the field-based studies show that in multiple contexts (e.g., drought, civil
strife, or both), farmers have been able to access the large majority of their seed from local channels.
Several trader assessments have further confirmed the availability of seed on a large scale—during
periods of outside aid. Again, availability is a relative term, and much depends on the means of traders
serving a region: their price margins, transport facilities, and seed sourcing networks.
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To date, only two types of cases have been identified that show when availability of seed in a disaster
context may be a fundamental constraint.. The first case is where local seed on offer is no longer adapted
to local growing contexts, often due to biotic and abiotic pressures (e.g., cases herein are in eastern
Kenya, due to bean root rots, and northern Mozambique, due to cassava brown streak). Purists might
label this problem as a seed quality constraint, rather than one of availability. However, the fact remains
that farmers did not have anything to plant that would actually grow.
The second case involves contexts where there have been substantial production shortfalls and local
markets have never sufficiently developed to deliver routine seed or planting supplies. In addressing this 
latter issue of availability and market failure, it might be useful to distinguish between spatial and
temporal issues of availability, or the lack thereof. Delving into the root causes for these lacks should
encourage practitioners to move from a focus on seed aid to one on strengthening the seed system.
Local seed/grain markets identified as a core element for seed
system stability
The more one looks at seed systems in detail, the more the role of local seed/grain markets appears as a
central element in promoting seed security. Varied market-related findings are emerging from direct
field analysis: 
1. Market-sourced seed (especially for self-pollinated crops and cereals, in general, with the
exception of maize) provides a core for farmer seed security, especially among the more vulnerable, 
e.g., in this volume, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and western Kenya; see also Rwanda (Sperling, 1997)
and eastern Kenya (Sperling, 2002).
2. Local grain markets, from which seed is obtained, have been shown to be more durable than
expected in stress periods, with analysis showing their functioning in periods of civil strife (e.g.,
Burundi) as well as in periods of drought and floods.
3. The genetic quality of seed sourced in markets is most often acceptable to farmers, as it is generally
grown in surrounding agroecological contexts.
4. Surprisingly, the physiological and phyto-sanitary quality of seed purchased in local markets can
also be partially regulated (through purchase from known contacts and rigorous farmer sorting).
Laboratory analyses (for purity, health, and germination) demonstrate acceptable quality
parameters for the market seed examined. Such data do not mean that all market seed is of high
quality. They do, however, firmly show that the reverse is not universally true. Market seed, a
priori, should not be equated with low-quality seed.
5. For the non-hybrids, local seed/grain markets are proving an important channel for moving new
varieties, that is, new genetic materials developed by formal research systems. In fact, for some
crop types, local markets seem to move new varieties more effectively than formal seed channels.
6. Markets have proven to be a useful source for re-accessing seed of desired types and quantities that
has been lost or temporarily abandoned in stress periods.
Given their pivotal role in seed system stability—and resilience—one of the major conclusions of our
case studies is that local grain/seed markets must be strategically supported, not undermined, in
post-stress periods. They provide a central core of seed security, particularly for the vulnerable.
Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development
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Seed systems during crisis prove generally resilient—except in
cases of crop/variety breakdown
Evidence shows that seed system resilience, of the local, farmer system, is the norm, rather than the
exception during periods of stress. “Resilience” in this context means that seed channels continue to
provide varieties and seed that farmers find of acceptable quality, and which will grow when sown.
Further, those analyses that focused on varietal diversity have generally found that major varieties are
not lost—not during drought, war, nor even select cases of flood (viz. Ferguson, 2003)
There are important exceptions to this observation on seed system resilience. In areas of crop
breakdown, when existing varieties no longer perform due to formidable pressures (usually plant disease 
or declining fertility), the local systems may not have the capacity themselves to bring in new materials.
Particularly in cases where vegetatively propagated crops (e.g., cassava, sweet potatoes) provide the
base of food security, outside assistance may become key. The problem of cassava mosaic virus in East
and Central Africa since the late 1980s demonstrates such need.
Misplaced seed-quality parameters in emergency response result
in overemphasis on “health” to the detriment of genetic quality
Issues of seed quality very much shape the types of seed assistance (and asset transfers) that can unfold.
In emergency seed procurement, quality issues most often focus on whether the seed is certified or not
(as many donors require formal verification as a prerequisite for seed procurement.). Quality stereotypes 
have equated certified and formal sector seed as being of high germination and good seed health, with
poor assessments applied to farmer seed (home-produced and procured from the market), which is
stereotyped as generally poor. Case study analyses have shown that such labels can be deceptive. The
quality of formal-sector seed may not be as advertised (this volume, see western Kenya case) and
emergency-grade seed overall is of highly variable health and genetic quality (eastern Kenya case).
Farmer seed and market seed has also proven to be “objectively” of good quality, as assessed in
laboratory analyses (western Kenya case).
Some of the existing emergency interventions build in special measures to examine quality on a
site-by-site basis, such as the catalyzing of regulating committees during seed vouchers and fairs
(SV&F). Undoubtedly, additional mechanisms can be put in place to reinforce acceptable quality
standards. Minimally, seed on offer via emergency assistance should be as least as good as that which
farmers routinely sow.
The focus on the seed health parameter of “quality” has diverted attention away from what is probably
the more important quality issue for seed: the seed on offer, at the very least, must be adapted to the stress 
conditions at hand, and have generally acceptable crop characteristics. It is puzzling that genetic
(variety) quality, in practice, has been given second priority in emergency responses. Varieties emerging 
from formal research sectors or on offer from commercial companies are assumed “good enough,”
whether or not they have been selected for use in the regions of stress or for growing under the
management conditions practiced by beneficiary farmers.
Optimally, the genetic quality on offer should anticipate on-site stresses; e.g., they should be early
maturing for those facing a hungry gap or resistant to specific disease pressures in areas with marked
pathogen build-up.
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Intervention-specific findings
Moving from the overview of seed system insights, the section below summarizes findings tied to
specific types of support interventions aimed at seed systems.
Broad pattern of default: DSD to CBM
At present, a narrow range of responses are employed to bolster seed systems in stress. Diagnoses being
minimal or perfunctory at best, the evolution of a seed-related assistance pattern is well established (see
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia cases, this volume) During emergencies, institutions jump to direct seed
distribution (DSD) by default. During recovery, institutions move to community-based multiplication
(CBM) schemes by default. So seed system assistance is characterized by “option by default.”
Practitioners supply interventions they feel competent to implement, but not necessarily the
interventions that are needed for a given context.
DSD versus SV&F: Misplaced comparison
The capability to conduct a range of interventions has created a divide in practitioner circles. Seed
vouchers and fairs are being implemented by those who sense the need to go beyond seeds and tools
(S&T), while S&T (re-baptized as direct seed distribution) remains the baseline response.
DSD is about seed—nothing more and nothing less. It assumes that seed is not available—and
orchestrates a seed transfer. If done well, a range of varieties and crops can be delivered to a large
number of beneficiaries—and in time for sowing. The DSD approach is neither inherently good nor bad.
SV&F at first glance, focuses on seed, and also involves a seed asset transfer. The baseline assumption
for implementing SV&F revolves around a problem of “access,” and, more explicitly, that there is not a
problem of availability in the disaster-affected zones.
As one looks more deeply, however, into the two asset-related transfers, it is clear that an “apple and
orange” comparison has been put forward. While both use seed as their most visible vehicle, SV&F are
implemented to achieve a much broader, and substantially different, set of goals (see eastern Kenya,
Burundi, western Uganda case studies, this volume). They are designed to build and stimulate local seed
systems under stress, as well as to give a boost to local trading economies in potentially unstable times.
In supporting local livelihood systems, SV&F, de facto, lay the immediate ground for moving away
from outside or external assistance and link relief and development aims from the early stages of a crisis.
Fine-tuning SVFS—only through follow-up
Three aspects of SV&F were also subject to greater scrutiny in the case studies, and unanticipated
insights emerged only because of follow-up:
• Agro-biodiversity not necessarily supported by SV&F
Contrary to expectations, crop and variety diversity is not enhanced, a priori, by the SV&F approach,
but neither are the systems de facto undermined. The diversity present at a fair cannot reflect the range of 
diversity in the farming system (some crops do not come to market and less sought-after varieties are not
put on offer by traders). The diversity actually put on offer is also not necessarily accessed by farmers:
some seek first to fill their vital needs—before their optional wants. More diversity-related transactions
could be promoted if, from the supply side, traders and seed sellers were given incentives to put more on
Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development
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offer (prizes? or modest subsidies for offering diverse and new varieties?). Demand might also be
stimulated, if farmers were given more knowledge about the products on offer, as well as the opportunity 
to purchase “trial” size samples. Ultimately, the demand side will have to be more strategically
stimulated if and when SV&F are reshaped to become innovation and livelihood fairs per se. SV&F
could serve as important venues for putting new varieties, management ideas, or agro-enterprise
products on offer. They are already being used to move non-seed inputs (as done at the trade input fairs
in Mozambique).
• Traders are important beneficiaries in SV&F, but not at farmers’ expense
Despite the small scale of transactions, traders at SV&F are often drawn from surrounding locales, and
prove key for injecting immediate cash into the stressed economy.
Traders emerge as a clear beneficiary group in SV&F, in addition to, but not at the expense of,
beneficiary buyers. In the Burundi case, those selling at fairs tended to emerge from a specialized trading 
class, with an evident female bias (women cannot easily own land). In western Uganda, traders were
generally seed sellers, as likely to be full-time farmers as not.
Traders particularly benefit from fairs in terms of (a) receiving direct cash payments (versus having to
extend credit), (b) having a high volume of daily sales, and (c) obtaining prices slightly higher than on
the open market.
As traders are generally local, investment in their business translates into investment into the local
economy, with the SV&F trader revenues in Burundi, for instance, being reinvested particularly in
commercial activities (including the extension of credit).
The coupling of farmer beneficiary and trader beneficiary seems to be a “win-win” situation. However,
as the scale of SV&F widens, the relative client benefits should be examined more closely.
• Analyses of cost-effectiveness not conclusive
Several cost-effectiveness analyses have been done comparing DSD and SV&F, and their results are not
conclusive. Much depends on the scale on which activities have been implemented and how these have
evolved through time (the capacity-building costs become lower as the relatively “unknown
approaches” become more familiar). The major difference in cost-benefits are not the direct effects so
much as the ancillary effects on surrounding seed, economic, and livelihood systems. In terms of seed,
per se, greater diversity is available through SV&F, as well as the important fact that they allow farmers
to select among that diversity in response to their own particular stress situation.
Variety introductions prove potentially key in a crisis but seed
diffusion channels need to be focus of equal concern
New varietal introductions can make a key difference to production and stability in crisis times.
However, the cases indicate several pivotal decisions that need to be made concomitantly with an
assessment that new varietal material may be warranted.
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• Variety basket should be on offer
A choice of varieties should be on offer—particularly as the context is one of stress. In both western
Kenya and northern Mozambique, the basket of options helped to anticipate probable future breakdowns 
of disease resistance.
• Not everything new is good
Not everything new is good. Maize hybrids, in particular, are often promoted as new items on offer in
stress contexts. However, their performance is very uneven as an emergency input (see Kenya,
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Malawi cases). This underlines the need for a strategy for new introductions to be
carefully weighed, particularly if the recipient herself is not the one selecting the precise emergency aid
option.
• The choice of specific diffusion channels is critical for new variety impact
The choice of diffusion channels for moving new varieties (formal, informal, market, groups of farmers,
etc.) is potentially as important for achieving impact as the quality of the product being diffused. It
makes strategic sense to build on channels that move products fast, widely, at low cost. The case
analyses showed unimpressive results for working through informal farmer seed multiplier groups, but
remarkable diffusion results via local grain/seed traders. Parallel to a focus on diffusion channels, the
varied seed production models being promoted throughout Africa (of which farmer multiplier groups are 
one) need to be designed from the start with an explicit impact-oriented outreach focus—if they are to
reach the vulnerable.
Several of the case studies showed that new varieties in themselves can have an important impact in
specific kinds of stressed contexts. However, research needs to speed up its product- development
response if it is to become a reliable partner in alleviating disaster scenarios.
Seed security: 
Moving forward the frontiers of disaster response
The steps for improv ing the ef fec tive ness of seed aid prac tice seem fairly straight for ward, and
implementable over the next five years. They in volve a com bi na tion of pos i tive strat e gies: (a) pro mot ing 
real learn ing eval u a tions that can fine-tune cur rent im ple men ta tion modes, (b) broad en ing the bas ket of
po ten tial re sponse op tions—through low-risk case sce nario tests and ca pac ity build ing, (c) supporting
as sess ments of seed sys tem se cu rity prior to in ter ven tion (which will also en cour age meth ods/tools to
be come fur ther re fined), and (d) de vel op ing strat e gies for “emer gen cies” that fac tor in chronic stress. A
fun da men tal step for mov ing for ward also in volves ac knowl edg ing that “more of the same”—re peated
DSD or SV&F—may not be achiev ing the ex pected hu man i tar ian aims. Most of the rec om men da tions
be low en cour age a mov ing away from knee-jerk emer gency re sponses—to wards interventions where
implementers better understand what they are implementing and why.
Evaluation of assistance 
The scale of seed aid has escalated since it was introduced as a complement to food aid about 15 years
ago. Given (a) its impressive scale, (b) the observation that seed aid has become repetitive, and (c)
evidence that aid can have negative as well as positive effects, evaluation should be promoted for a range 
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of contexts. Perfunctory evaluations (such as tallying the quantity of seed distributed to x number of
farmers) serve as little more than self-confirming checklists that implementers have “done a good job.”
Instead, evaluations should minimally have two salient characteristics: 
• First, they should be situated within a brief analysis of the functioning of on-going seed systems and
frankly assess how important the aid was versus other seed-related sources and support. Taking a
sample of farmers and finding out what they actually sowed and why is quick, easy to do, and gives a
reality check on the importance of the intervention.
• Second, each evaluation should program a critical question follow-up so as not to repeat the same
mistakes: e.g., did the poorest get seed? (why or why not?) Was the crop profile on offer appropriate?
(why or why not?) Did farmers re-sow the new varieties delivered? (why or why not?) 
The money required for such follow-ups is modest in relation to the funds employed in the intervention
itself. The time required for such punctual questions involves but a matter of weeks. If such modest
time/money commitments prove obstacles for implementing organizations, they should not be
intervening at the heart of vulnerable farming systems. Ideally, evaluations of seed system support
should also be framed within assessments of the larger regional economy and livelihoods, but it is
unrealistic to expect the quick-response teams to conduct in-depth analyses. So for moving evaluation in 
seed aid forward, we suggest the practical and do-able, and consign the “ideal” (more in-depth) to
specialists.1 
Broadening the base of response options: 
Focus on capacity building
The rep er toire of seed sys tem re sponses in emer gen cies has al ready been broad en ing, par tic u larly in the
last four years, with seed fairs, vouch ers, di rect cash pay ments, in put and live li hood fairs, etc., Fur ther
fol low-ups an a lyz ing and com par ing these op tions are un der way in a num ber of coun tries and are sup -
ported by sev eral agen cies (e.g., in Ethi o pia: OFDA/USAID and ODI). Un for tu nately, im ple men ta tion
of re sponse al ter na tives is fre quently de-linked from an anal y sis of the prob lem at hand (see next point
on needs as sess ment), and pro-linked to the cur rent spe cific ca pac ity of the im ple ment ing or ga ni za tion.
There is an ur gent need to build the ca pac ity of im ple ment ers to en gage in a range of re sponse op tions.
With out an ex plicit do nor focus on practitioner capacity building, we will get more of the same.
Refinement and promotion of seed system security assessments
(SSSA)
The methodology for doing seed system security assessments is quickly being honed, and key elements
can be applied immediately. Work during the last few years has shown which seed channels to focus on
during acute crisis (90% of the time, own production and local seed/grain markets) and how to assess
whether such channels are functioning, at what level, and for whom.
For instance, one of the tenets of the SSSA Guide  (CIAT/CRS/CN, forthcoming) is that “production
shortfall is not necessarily equal to seed shortfall.” Modeled after actual Eastern African farming
parameters, the example illustrated in table 5 clearly shows that one can lose most of the harvest (88%
for beans and even 99% for sorghum) and still have enough seed to sow—assuming that all the crop
harvested can be saved for actual planting.
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1. At the time of this writing, CRS has conducted ex post evaluations of seed vouchers & fairs in Gambia, Ethiopia, and
Zimbabwe, and has recently completed a meta-analysis of the SV&F approach (Bramel and Remington, forthcoming).
Our understanding now of the importance of local grain/seed markets is also contributing to the SSSA
guides and shifting the focus of methods beyond assessing what farmers actually have in their hands
(own production and home stocks) to what they can access. Two key parameters shape market analysis
in the SSSA in particular. Differences between the seed and grain on offer need to be factored in across
crops, and a spatial overlap must be laid over market zones and zones of agroecological adaptation.. In
all cases, elements of a comprehensive SSSA thinking guide are in place, and such seed security
assessments—as distinct from food-need calculations—should be encouraged in the coming years. Only 
with more focused seed security assessments can we hope to more toward more tailored support
responses.
Table 5. The Relation between Harvest (Home Production) and Seed Needed for
Sowing (Theoretical Example, Eastern Africa)
Crop Beans Sorghum
Surface area per household ¼ ha ¼ ha
Seeding rates per hectare 100 10
Sowing needs per surface sown (¼ ha) 25 kg 2.5
Multiplication rates of seed 8 100
Harvest per surface sown (¼ ha) 200 250
% of harvest needed to meet basic sowing needs 12.5 1.0
Source: SSSA Guide (CIAT/CRS/CN, forthcoming).
Factoring in chronic stress needs from 
the beginning of an emergency response
Finally, we highlight an implication of one of our key findings: that much of the acute response is being
implemented in more chronically stressed contexts, where a swath of the population is continually
vulnerable—usually due to poverty.
In such a context, the emergency response should explicitly work through a lens that anticipates features
of such chronic stress. At a minimum, interventions should be avoided that (a) expose farmers to
increased risk and (b) have the potential to undermine functioning systems. In a positive vein,
interventions should be promoted that (a) counter the stress but which also (b) aim to strengthen farmers’ 
own capacities, bolster the functioning of their farming systems, and stimulate growth in the local
economy. We now know firmly, mostly through seed systems studies, that seed (in)security is rarely
about seed—and almost always about poverty. Hence, those implementing emergency responses should
now face the obligation to squarely address this poverty link, even during periods of stress.
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